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Abstract
This paper investigates the 1853–56 food crisis in Europe. It argues that this was not a classic famine 
triggered by a far-reaching decline in food availability. Instead, it was one of the first instances of a 
‘food price crisis’ on an international scale: a crisis instigated by high prices obstructing access to food 
for large parts of the population. This crisis stemmed from new forms of vulnerability resulting from 
the internationalization of supply chains, the proletarianization of labour and the commercialization 
of goods and services. As such, it mainly affected market-dependent urban populations. We conclude 
by drawing parallels with the contemporary global food system.
‘[W]hy was there apparently no crisis in the mid-1850s at all comparable to that in the late 
1840s?’, asked Peter Solar in his contribution to a collection of essays on the impact of the 
potato blight in Europe published in 2007.1 In terms of food price levels and decline of 
purchasing power, the 1850s were as severe as the 1840s, if not worse. Solar pointed out that 
throughout north-west Europe, annual mean wheat prices from 1853 to 1856 were as high as 
those of 1847 and moreover remained so for several consecutive years. Yet the ‘hungry fifties’ 
did not become as familiar a phrase as the Hungry Forties. Whether that means that the food 
crisis of the later decade was less devastating and if so, why, is uncertain. Few scholars have 
turned their attention to the 1850s (the work of Laurent Herment is a recent exception), and 
much of what we know comes from passing references.2 With this paper, we want to draw 
attention to this episode in western European history. We investigate whether it really had less 
impact than the Hungry Forties and offer an explanation as to why this might have been the 
case. We do this by focusing on the case of Belgium.
Previous studies have indicated that, if the overall impact of the 1850s food crisis was mild, 
it wasn’t mild at all for those who lived through it. Chevet and Ó Gráda believe that the four 
years from 1853 to 1856 were ‘without contest’ as dramatic as 1846, yet Alfani and Ó Gráda’s 
recent overview of famines defined as killing events includes the 1840s but not the 1850s.3 In 
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one of the few case studies, Laurent Herment stated that the food crisis in the surroundings 
of Paris was severe because of high prices, the size of the harvest deficits, the duration of the 
crisis and the disruption of the grain trade by the Crimean War. Urban populations suffered 
but rural populations were barely touched.4 In his study of per capita food intake in the 
Netherlands, Merijn Knibbe calculated that cereal consumption in the 1850s did not decline 
substantially. By contrast, the consumption of animal products declined, causing the biological 
standard of living to reach its nineteenth-century nadir in the 1850s.5 The incidence of food 
riots in England, France, Belgium and Sweden further testifies to distress in this decade.6 
Several authors have highlighted the international dimension of the crisis, pointing to the 
impact of the Crimean War, but also suggesting a link between the drop in European grain 
prices after 1856 and the US financial Panic of 1857.7
Solar gives several reasons why the 1850s appears to have had a milder overall impact: wheat 
prices were similar but peaks in potato prices were less pronounced in the 1850s than in the 
1840s. Much of the vulnerable population had already been eliminated during the 1840s crisis, 
markets may have been more efficient after the repeal of the Corn Laws, and governments may 
have learnt how to handle such crises after the experience of the 1840s.8 Likewise, Herment 
emphasizes the efforts of the French government to alleviate distress: it reacted quickly, 
encouraged local administrations to take action and supported public works to provide the 
poor with an income.9
Our main argument is that the 1840s and 1850s food crises, beyond similarities in mean 
annual price levels, were very different in nature. The 1840s witnessed what we call a ‘famine 
crisis’, whereas the 1850s crisis constituted one of the first ‘food price crises’ on an international, 
perhaps even global scale. The first type of crisis is caused by a substantial food availability 
decline affecting broad groups of society. By contrast, the latter type of crisis is the result 
primarily of disruptions in trade rather than output, affecting primarily the market-dependent 
population: wage labourers, small artisans and people in retailing professions, i.e. those groups 
not directly involved in food production and not having direct, non-market-mediated access to 
food. While both types of crises might have a similar effect on prices, they will have a different 
impact on different groups in society.
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I
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the classic, localized form of famine crisis had been 
in retreat in Europe for several centuries. Traditional famines have been mostly described as 
local crises characterized by sudden drops in food supplies and by excess mortality. They are 
almost always linked to natural disasters (rain, temperature), ecological shocks (eruptions, 
blights, plagues) and/or manmade calamities (war), reducing food supplies and/or disturbing 
food supply mechanisms.10 England and Northern Italy witnessed their last severe famines in 
the seventeenth century. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century mortality peaks in France and 
the Low Countries were modest by comparison with those of previous centuries, even in the 
crisis years of 1740–41, 1794–95, 1816–18 and 1845–48. It appears that the Western European 
story of famine ended in 1845–48 with a ‘big bang’: the Irish Famine, measured in share of the 
population lost, was one of the most devastating food crises in world history.11
During the second half of the nineteenth century, Europe saw a massive increase in food 
availability. This coincided with more food security, declining relative food prices and a 
shrinking agricultural population. These developments mark the onset of the first global food 
regime into which food producers worldwide were integrated.12 The extension and commodi-
fication of food chains and the delinking of production from consumption generated an 
unprecedented flow of cheap foodstuffs to Europe and brought an end to classic famine crises 
in this part of the world.
However, the commercialization of food and labour in the globalizing food regime also 
created new vulnerabilities, making much larger sections of the population than previously 
sensitive to food price crises. These new vulnerabilities included a dependence on wages and on 
international market conditions. New forms of food entitlement, from direct to indirect market-
mediated access, thoroughly changed the political economy of food provisioning. Negotiations 
related to food supplies and food prices used to be part of the local moral economy based on 
a twofold principle: a right to food, and a social contract of reciprocal accountability.13 Our 
prime argument is that within a context of extending markets and food chains, a decline in 
community reciprocities created a new vulnerability to food price shocks, affecting first and 
foremost expanding market-dependent urban populations.14
In this article we argue that high prices from 1853 to 1856 marked an international food 
price crisis, as distress was much more the result of the price and distribution of food than of 
its availability. The relationship between prices and supplies during this crisis differed from 
famine crises in two respects: high prices without severe shortages, and a peculiar pattern in 
the movement of grain prices. There were no profound shortages of staple food in the 1850s in 
the countries surrounding the North Sea. Potatoes gradually became more resilient to blight, 
and cereal deficits on local and national levels were complemented by imports. What mattered 
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for consumers were the rising cost of food and their declining purchasing power. What was 
new in the 1850s was that food entitlement through markets became the prime arena for the 
struggle for food security. In several respects the 1853–56 food crisis established a new model. 
Starting in the late 1840s, the international grain market became a major determinant of price 
for the domestic markets in the North Sea area. Earlier, imports had been important for parts 
of this region, such as Flanders in the late Middle Ages and Holland in the early modern 
period, but from the middle of the nineteenth century they became vital for large parts of 
Europe.15 In addition, as imports increased, local agricultural producers were able to turn away 
from basic food production towards specialization, or to abandon agriculture altogether. This 
is connected to the intertwined processes of urbanization, proletarianization and industriali-
zation, swelling the ranks of the wage-dependent population.16 Last but not least, this was an 
international crisis: it affected most industrializing nations and surpassed the geographic limits 
of earlier famine crises.
On this occasion, our focus is on Belgium, the first industrialized nation outside England, 
though we expect our findings will also apply to other industrializing and urbanizing regions 
in Great Britain and northern France. We compare the causes and effects of the crisis years of 
the 1850s (which we claim constituted a modern food price crisis) with the crisis of the 1840s 
(which was mainly a classic famine crisis). We will follow two lines of reasoning. Firstly, we 
measure the extent of the decline in food availability and the rise of food prices in Belgium in 
the 1840s and 1850s. During a food price crisis, we expect the decrease in food supplies to be 
much smaller compared to the famine years in the 1840s. Since food price crises are triggered 
by market disruptions and price peaks, the link with (substantial) food shortages at the 
micro- and macro-level should be much less stringent than in classic supply crises. Secondly, 
we compare the impact of the crises of the 1840s and 1850s on urban and rural populations, 
focusing on the incidence of food riots, and on shifting levels of mortality, natality and poverty. 
We assume that the proportion of market-dependent households, buying most of their food, 
is larger in urban than in rural regions, and vice-versa for the proportion of households with 
other entitlements to food, i.e. (partial) self-sufficiency and reciprocal credit relations. We 
expect that the 1840s famine affected both types of households, through the price mechanism 
as well as the physical absence of food, whereas the 1850s food price crisis would affect mainly 
the market-dependent population, as supplies were available but prices high. Looking at the 
experiences of towns and countryside in the 1840s and 1850s is an indirect way of looking at 
the experiences of these different groups of households. We expect urban areas in the 1850s to 
have suffered more than rural areas.
The remainder of this article is divided into three parts. First, we look at the proximate 
causes of the 1850s food crisis: harvest results, price developments, and distortions to the 
international grain trade during the Crimean War. Next, we explain why Belgium had become 
vulnerable to international food price crises in the mid-nineteenth century by focusing on 
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population growth and market-dependency. Finally, we analyse the effects of this outburst of 
a food price crisis by looking at food availability, food riots, poverty levels and demographic 
patterns. We conclude by drawing some parallels with the present-day, global food system.
II
In July 1853, at the start of a new harvest year, wheat prices began to rise in the North Sea area 
(see Figure 1). This was the onset of the food crisis of the 1850s, three years of sustained high 
grain prices, which ended only in late 1856. Starting in the summer of 1853 at about 20 francs 
per hectolitre, wheat prices rose to 30 francs by the end of the year and continued to fluctuate 
between 25 and 35 francs until the end of 1856, when prices returned to previous levels. From 
1854 to 1856, mean annual prices equalled those of 1847.
A comparison with price developments in earlier crises indicates that this was not a classic 
famine. First, the duration of the period of sustained high prices was much longer (see Figure 
2). Secondly, the seasonal price development was markedly different. In a famine crisis, prices 
generally followed the soudure-pattern, at least in the Southern Netherlands.17 For example, 
after the harvest failures of 1739, 1816 and 1846, prices in the market of Sint-Niklaas, Belgium, 
gradually soared until the following winter, reached peak levels between May and June, 
and consistently declined and even collapsed after the harvest months (see Figure 3). Prices 
recorded at the same market between 1853 and 1855 show an entirely different rhythm: they 
rose much earlier in the agricultural year and remained high for much longer. The only 
exception was a period of low prices in September 1854 following on episodes of market 
riots.18
Even though price levels were comparable, harvest deficits were generally less dramatic 
in 1853–56 than in the 1840s, although differences between regions in the North Sea area 
were considerable (see Table 1). In 1846, particularly rye yields fell far below normal levels. 
In 1853 and 1855 wheat yields were deficient, although not as much as rye yields had been in 
the 1840s. The German areas did comparatively well in 1853 but were struck harder in 1855. 
In most countries, both 1846 and 1853 were followed by abundant harvests. In England, 1847 
was below average but the bumper harvest of 1854 made this an annus mirabilis according to 
contemporary accounts.19 Only in France were yields in 1854 probably insufficient to make 
up for the previous year’s losses.20 These harvest outcomes did not have a straightforward 
effect on price levels. Although the 1847 wheat harvest was below average in England, prices 
collapsed in the second half of that year. By contrast, the 1854 bumper harvest failed to have 
the same effect.
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How yields affected food availability depended on the share of wheat and rye in regional 
output structures. The 1850s production deficits probably struck rye-producing areas such as 
Saxony and Prussia, which harvested two to three times more rye than wheat, less hard.21 
Wheat-producing areas such as England and France, the latter growing three times more wheat 
than rye, were probably struck worse. Still, domestic production may still have covered 90 per 
cent of Britain’s needs during the 1850s crisis, partly through an extension of the area under 
wheat.22 Belgium held an in-between position, producing slightly more rye than wheat.23 In 
Belgium, per capita bread grain output (wheat, rye, maslin, and spelt) net of grain reserved for 
seed from 1848 to 1852 was about 208kg on average. In 1846, it was 135kg; in 1853 and 1855, it 
was 171kg and 158kg respectively.24 Deficits were therefore smaller in the 1850s.
Furthermore, total food availability in 1845 and 1846 had suffered heavily from the potato 
blight, which made its first devastating appearance in these years. In 1845, the blight destroyed 
70 per cent of the potato harvest in the Netherlands and almost 90 per cent in Belgium; in 
1846 it destroyed about 80 to 90 per cent in the Scottish Highland and Ireland.25 After the 
mid-1840s, potato yields slowly recovered, reaching ‘normal’ levels again by the mid-1850s.26 
Potato prices rose both in the years 1846–47 and in 1854–55. In the 1840s, the price peak stood 
out more clearly, though the absolute price level in Belgium in the 1850s was similar.27
Therefore, in most areas including Belgium, deficits in the 1850s were rather modest 
compared to the 1840s, and cannot explain the general nature and longevity of high prices 
from 1854 to 1856. Three immediate factors help to explain why prices started to rise almost 
simultaneously with the harvest of 1853.28 Firstly, the weak harvests of 1853 made clear that 
demand for grain imports in wheat-producing countries like France and England would rise. 
This almost instantly triggered more orders and higher ship freight rates. Secondly, after it 
had become clear that international demand would rise, rumours of an impending war in the 
Black Sea area in June 1853 generated uncertainty about the shipment of grain from Russia, a 
prime supplier of European markets. This created a sense of urgency and, as a result, imports 
were negotiated much earlier. Quoting Klovland, a ‘scramble for wheat’ started, further raising 
freight rates.29 Third, the uncertainty created by the threat of war also elevated insurance rates. 
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Together these elements made grain shipments more expensive. Grain prices kept on rising 
during and after the harvest of 1853.
Although freight rates declined once hostilities had broken out, grain prices remained high. 
The war itself had a direct impact on Western European grain markets as a consequence of the 
Allies’ blockade of Black Sea and Baltic ports, and of Russia’s prohibition of grain exports.30 
Russia prohibited exports from the Black Sea and Azov in February 1854 and from Baltic 
ports at the end of 1855. All embargoes on exports were lifted in the spring of 1856. During the 
war, Western European grain markets were cut off from the large volumes of Russian grain 
that could have helped cover western deficits. Only small amounts of Russian grain reached 
Western Europe through smuggling or via overland routes through Prussia and Austria. 
Export statistics from Russia and data from importing countries confirm that the trade in 
Russian grain came to a standstill in 1854 and 1855.31 National deficits in the North Sea area 
were made good, except perhaps in France, by drawing on supplies from elsewhere including 
Prussia and, increasingly, Sweden and the United States.32 Still, the cessation of Russian 
imports was clearly a major cause for concern. Prices only started declining in 1856, when the 
conflict was over and imports from Russia resumed.
In the crisis years, the Belgian government regularly turned to the provincial governors 
and their regional consultative bodies for advice on the causes of the high price of grain and 
on possible remedies.33 In correspondence at the start of the food crisis, the alarming rise in 
prices during the harvest months of 1853 was attributed to speculation and increased exports 
to France, where shortages were believed to be much larger. The resulting rising food prices 
reduced the purchasing power of the labouring classes, reducing the demand for manufactured 
products, which created more unemployment, and hence exacerbated the effects of grain being 
expensive. One year later, in September 1854, the Minister of the Interior noted a new rise in 
grain prices, which he rightly believed did not reflect the actual yields of the grain crops.34 
Among other reasons, he pointed to stocks from the 1853 harvest running out. While the 
harvests of 1854 seemed excellent, they had not become available in the markets yet partly 
because the farming population was still too busy harvesting. This time, the international 
situation was identified as the main cause for high prices: the closure of the Baltic and Black Sea 
ports and a meagre harvest in the US reduced imports. Others regarded exports, which were 
still permitted, as the main reason for rising market pressures. However, the governor of East 
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Flanders wrote that more was to be expected from the news of the taking of Sebastopol than 
from any customs measures to ease distress.35 The disturbance of the international grain trade 
due to the war continued in the following years, bankrupting several merchant companies. 
For this reason, the Ghent Chamber of Commerce believed in October 1856 that prices would 
only drop when trade was restored and Russian grain once again arrived in Belgian ports.36
The Belgian government was slow to respond to the likelihood of higher prices and a 
probable decline in food availability after the mediocre harvest of 1853. Import duties on 
foodstuffs were lifted fairly promptly in August, but food exports continued to be permitted 
except for potatoes, whose export was banned in October. An export prohibition on cereals 
was only enacted at the end of November 1854, after a wave of food riots. The nature and timing 
of these measures is very close to the parallel measures taken in France.37 The Belgian export 
prohibition remained in place until June 1857 and free, untaxed imports were permitted until 
the following December. In contrast to previous decades, the 1850s were characterized by sharp 
disagreements on customs policies between supporters of a free-trade regime, who often had 
interests in the expanding industrial sector, and prohibitionists, who were usually connected to 
agriculture and landed property. The correspondence on this question between the government 
and the provincial governors, testifies to this division of opinion and their uncertainty about 
how to proceed.38 Their indecision stands in sharp contrast to the swift reaction of the Belgian 
government after the first upsurge of the potato blight in September 1845. On that occasion, 
the government immediately proclaimed the tariff-free import of grains, potatoes and other 
foodstuffs, whilst simultaneously forbidding their export together with that of bread and other 
baked products. These laws remained in force until the beginning of 1850. At the same time, 
the national government started to buy food from foreign countries.39
III
The proximate causes for sustained, high grain prices in the 1850s were modest harvest failures 
inside and outside the North Sea area and the dislocation of the international grain trade by 
the war in the Black Sea area. However, this does not explain the local impact of this crisis. It 
is clear that in this period, Belgium became more sensitive to shocks in the international grain 
trade. This was the result of two interrelated trends: a growing population and an increasing 
number of market-dependent households.
In the century between 1750 and 1850, the population of the southern Netherlands/Belgium 
doubled to more than 4.4 million inhabitants. After 1850, population growth continued at 
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a slightly slower pace, almost reaching 6.7 million inhabitants by 1900.40 The share of the 
urban population remained constant up to about 1850. Measured as the proportion of the 
population living in municipalities of 5000 inhabitants or more, the degree of urbanization 
stagnated at around 20 per cent from 1750 until 1850.41 In absolute numbers, much of the 
growth occurred in the countryside. In 1846, compared to 1806, there were 1.35 million 
additional mouths to feed: about 1 million in the countryside, and 0.35 million in the towns.42 
Due to land scarcity and unequal access to land, most of the people in the countryside did 
not produce enough food to support themselves and had to enter the food market for at least 
some of their sustenance.
Belgian agricultural output did not keep up with population growth after 1800, making the 
country increasingly dependent on food imports. In the first half of the nineteenth century, 
agricultural output grew but lagged behind population. As a result, per capita agricultural 
production declined.43 In response, the focus of agriculture shifted towards basic food 
production: the production of industrial crops declined to the benefit of both potatoes and 
bread grains. The simultaneous rise in the production of more highly valued wheat and 
cheaper potatoes indicates a polarization in consumption patterns. Growing tensions in 
agricultural production and output affected towns in particular. Segers calculated that urban 
per capita food consumption dropped in the first half of the nineteenth century, not only in 
industrial centres but also in smaller towns.44 According to Scholliers, around the middle of 
the nineteenth century, average food consumption was notably more modest in the towns than 
in the countryside.45 Agricultural progress after 1850 was piecemeal; Blomme labels the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century as ‘sluggish growth ending in straightforward stagnation 
during the 1870s’.46 Growth in output further slowed down, and although acreage for industrial 
and fodder crops increased, there was no fundamental change in the agricultural production 
structure before the last quarter of the century.47 Up to the 1840s, a Malthusian supply crisis 
was averted by a growing reliance on potatoes, which could feed twice as many people per 
hectare than cereals. The outbreak of the blight in September 1845 revealed the population’s 
growing dependence on potato consumption. After the 1840s, no comparable food crisis 
occurred due to the absence of combined harvest failures such as in 1845 and 1846, and because 
of increased cereal imports.48
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As a result of rapid demographic growth and lagging agricultural production, the southern 
Netherlands/Belgium shifted from being a grain-exporting to a grain-importing region. In 
the second half of the eighteenth century, the southern Netherlands exported about 5 to 7 per 
cent of its annual harvest of bread grains and buckwheat. These exports continued during 
the period when the region was annexed to France; in those years, large amounts of grain 
were transported to the French interior.49 It was probably the crisis of 1817 and the ensuing 
agricultural depression of the 1820s that ended grain exports from the southern Netherlands. 
During this depression, Western Europe was flooded with eastern European and Russian 
grain, while also facing domestic overproduction. In response, domestic output declined.50 In 
the late 1820s, domestic production recovered and expanded, but food imports soon became 
necessary on a structural basis, particularly from the 1840s onwards. Still, the overall volume 
of imports remained modest (see Table 2). During the price crisis of the 1850s, the volume of 
imports into Belgium amounted to about 11 per cent of the volume of the domestic bread grain 
harvest: 15 per cent for wheat, spelt, and maslin and 5 per cent for rye. In other words, 90 per 
cent of the bread grain needed for domestic use was still provided by domestic production.
Nonetheless, growing imports strengthened the impact of the international grain trade on 
local and national supplies and prices, and reinforced the integration of markets. But why 
and how did high prices affect large parts of the population? The second cause of increasing 
sensitivity in Belgium to shocks in the international grain trade was the unprecedented growth 
of a market-dependent population.51 In the middle of the nineteenth century, one in three 
Belgian households had no access to land, compared to less than one in five around 1800.52 
On top of that, almost half of the agricultural holdings measured less than one hectare and a 
majority of those holdings were held by lease for rapidly increasing rents. In other words, about 
two-thirds of all Belgian families had to acquire at least a portion of their nutritional needs via 
extra-household supplies. In addition, this was a period of accelerated industrialization with 
the number of wage labourers growing much faster than the total population. It is clear that the 
proportion of the population that was partly or predominantly dependent on wage earnings 
to secure access to food increased sharply, decreasing the proportion of households with other 
kinds of entitlements such as auto-consumption, local credit relations and payments in kind.
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Expanding industrial areas, such as the Walloon industrial basins, required larger catchment 
areas to feed the workers and their families. In response, the configuration of the internal 
grain trade changed profoundly. Weekly public markets had long played a central role in the 
trade of domestically produced grain. Yet only a small proportion of the annual harvest was 
physically exchanged at these markets. In 1856, trade at the 33 main grain markets in Belgium 
added up to 17.4 per cent of the total wheat harvest and 8.6 per cent of the total rye harvest 
(see Table 2). Trade volumes at public markets declined as more transactions were concluded 
by sample rather than by total volume. In addition, towns and cities were increasingly supplied 
by tradesmen who bought crops at the farm gate.53 This shift in the organization of marketing 
started in the bigger cities, but smaller towns followed from the 1860s onwards.54 By the end 
of the nineteenth century, public grain markets had all but disappeared.55
Grain sold at the farm gate was often bought by weight, in metric units, where in the public 
markets it was usually sold by volume, often in ancient local units of measurement.56 This shift 
ta bl e  2: Bread grain production, imports and market trade in Belgium, 1840s and 1850s
Average production Wheat, spelt, and maslin Rye Total
1846 6,493,396 5,293,191 11,786,587
1856 8,475,731 6,065,716 14,541,447
Imports
Annual average of 1852–1856 1,276,172 331,144 1,607,316
As a percentage of production in 1856 15.1 5.5 11.1
Market trade
Trade volume at the 33 main grain markets, 
September 1856 to August 1857
1,003,562 521,282 1,524,844
As a percentage of production in 1856 17.4 8.6 12.9
Note: All production and trade volumes in hectolitre. Market trade volumes only include wheat and rye, not spelt 
or maslin, and the proportion sold is calculated accordingly. Market trade volumes of Liège are not included as 
they appear faulty.
Source: Production data: Agriculture, recensement général, 1846, 1856; Import data: Daniel Degrève, Le commerce 
extérieur de la Belgique, 1830–1913–1939 (1982), pp. 304, 309; Market trade volumes: Bulletin administratif du 
ministère de l’Intérieur.
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from volume to weight, and to a concurrent standardization of measurements, reflects the 
geographical expansion of the grain trade and the growing number of intermediaries. Data on 
weight or the specific gravity of grain was needed to price accurately merchandise from diverse 
geographic origins passing through intermediaries.57 Concluding transactions by weight rather 
than by volume permitted these intermediaries to assess the quality of domestic grain more 
reliably, whether at the farm gate or in public markets, or imported grain purchased from 
international merchants.
By compiling information on a much larger scale, the intermediaries contributed significantly 
to the convergence of grain prices both intra-nationally and internationally.58 Conversely, their 
behaviour could also be perceived as deceitful speculation. In the crisis years of 1847 and 1854, 
the peculiar idea circulated that all the grain markets in the country should be held on the 
same day and hour. Advocates of this idea believed that markets would then be able to function 
in isolation from each other, and prices could be set without interference from other markets. 
This project was actually aimed against price integration.59 It received little support, however, 
because few believed it would have the desired effect.60 General opposition to this project is 
indicative of an altered attitude to the role of market trade and of the increasing interaction 
between local markets and the international grain trade around 1850.
As a result of demographic growth, lagging agricultural output, a growing market-dependent 
population and market integration, Belgian consumers increasingly competed with those of 
other importing countries for the same resources. After the middle of the nineteenth century, 
people buying wheat at a provincial Belgian market (such as Sint-Niklaas) paid prices similar to 
those at the London market, even though the purchasing power of British consumers may have 
been higher than that of Belgian consumers. This reflects the high degree of market integration 
in Europe at that time. Recent research has shown that the process of market integration 
accelerated during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, creating a ‘European’ grain 
market by the late 1840s.61 Studies relying on Swiss and Swedish observations have argued 
that, at the national level, price jumps were still mainly the result of climatic shocks until at 
least the middle of the nineteenth century.62 Yet market integration made this correlation less 
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straightforward by the 1850s, and as a result, national price levels no longer reflected national 
harvest results.
IV
It is our argument that, due to the different nature of the two crises, the effects of the food price 
crisis of 1853–56 were fundamentally different from the famine crisis of 1845–47. We expect that 
this dissimilarity will be most evident when comparing the rural and urban experience during 
the 1850s food crisis. In contrast with the potato famine in the 1840s, this crisis was primarily 
triggered by reduced consumer purchasing power. We measure this changing access to food 
in four ways: the availability of food, the incidence of food riots, rural and urban patterns in 
natality and mortality, and rural and urban patterns in poverty rates. 
(a) The availability of food
Yves Segers has calculated that average food availability in mid-nineteenth century Belgium 
was at a low and even critical level. The mean diet of Belgian residents dropped from about 
2850Kcal per day around 1800 to about 2450Kcal around 1850.63 Segers’ data in Figure 4 show 
the levels of food available for human consumption between 1846 and 1860. Consumption 
data on vegetable products are based on annual harvest results, imports and exports, and 
estimates of the proportion of these products not used for human consumption, but do not 
take into account the possibility of carry-over from one harvest to the next. For animal 
products, insufficient data were available to reconstruct accurately annual fluctuations, with 
the exception of cheese.64 Average per capita food consumption was depressed over the whole 
period and not only during the crisis years. The data indicate that between 1853 and 1856 
the availability of bread grains and, to a lesser extent, potatoes, was not notably lower than 
during the previous years. In this respect, Segers’ results confirm those of an earlier study 
by Van den Eeckhout and Scholliers.65 Imports covered harvest deficits, and considering 
the export prohibition of November 1854, carry-over from the excellent harvest of that year 
probably compensated for the deficit in 1855. Large volumes of wheat and rye were imported 
despite the war in the east, particularly from (or through) Prussia and the Netherlands.66 
Likewise, data on grain supplies at local markets show an increase, particularly from 1854 
onwards.67 In Sint-Niklaas for example, a local newspaper reported in November 1854 that 
countrymen were selling more wheat and buckwheat in the market to take advantage of 
high prices, while they themselves consumed imported rice.68 Stability in per capita food 
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supplies in the 1850s contrasts sharply with the crop shortages of the 1840s, starting with the 
severe winter of 1844–45. After the initial appearance of the blight in 1845, potato harvests 
in Belgium remained on average 40 to 60 per cent below pre-crisis levels from 1846 to 1850 
(except the harvest of 1849). The food situation became very precarious in late 1846 and the 
first half of 1847. This was aggravated by poor bread grain, bean and pea harvests. Calculated 
in grain equivalents, the combined loss of bread grain and potato harvests in 1846 amounted 
to 66 per cent.69
The mid-1850s food crisis was not characterized by a sudden decline in the availability of 
food: it was the disturbance in the international grain trade that made consumer prices rise 
sharply. Access to food became difficult for those lacking the required purchasing power. 
Around the middle of the nineteenth century, about half of private expenditure went on food.70 
Among households with an income below average, this proportion was undoubtedly larger. 
In these circumstances, a sudden rise in food prices could wreak havoc if wages did not rise 
accordingly. As Scholliers’ index figures (1913=100) show, nominal wages rose sharply in the 
1850s, from index 40 in 1850 to 53 in 1856, but real wages stagnated or declined, from 52 in 1850 
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f ig u r e  4: Indices of per capita food availability in Belgium, 1846–1860
Note: Average for 1850–1852 = 100. 
Source: Yves Segers, Economische groei en levensstandaard (2003), pp. 497, 501; Exposé de la situation du royaume, 
1841–1850; 1851–1860.
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to between 47 and 51 from 1853 to 1855.71 Furthermore, not all occupational groups experienced 
a rise in nominal wages. For example, wages in Voortman’s spinning mill in Ghent stagnated.72
The hardship experienced in these years was revealed by the first budget survey held in 
Belgium in about 1854, which specifically focused on urban and rural labouring households.73 
Edouard Ducpétiaux, reporting the results from this survey, concluded that the food intake of 
labouring households was often deficient, both in the towns and countryside. He noted how 
in a large number of cases, expenditure exceeded incomes; wage levels no longer corresponded 
with food price levels. The resulting deficits were covered by makeshifts, public charity, debt 
accumulation, or they led to bankruptcies. More generally, it was not only labourers who were 
facing distress as a result of the recent rise in food prices but also shopkeepers, subordinate 
employees and even small rentiers. The main causes of this price rise, according to Ducpétiaux, 
were population growth and the structural production deficit, the war in the East, but also the 
increased consumption of grain. In response to the blight, people ate fewer potatoes and more 
bread and butter. That, he argued, explained why food prices in 1854 were high, despite that 
year’s abundant harvest.74
(b) The incidence of food riots
High food prices amid harvests that did not seem particularly deficient triggered numerous 
food riots.75 Between August and October 1853, food riots were recorded in Liège, Sint-Niklaas 
and Brussels. Between May and July 1855, the markets of Sint-Niklaas and Ghent were the 
scene of disturbances, while in September 1856 there was uproar in Ghent. In addition to 
these localized incidents, there was a wave of food riots in East and West Flanders and the 
surrounding regions from August to September 1854. Riots were reported in the cities of 
Tournai, Ypres, Courtrai, Menen, Lokeren, Sint-Niklaas (twice), Bruges, Brussels, Oudenaarde 
and Mechelen. In many cases, these incidents started at the public markets after one or more 
merchants were accused of driving up prices. In other instances, bakeries were looted. The 
timing of this wave of food riots suggests that they were a response to a perceived discrepancy 
between the excellent harvest that was being brought in at that time, and the persistently high 
level of grain prices.76 Although food shortages were much more severe in 1846 and early 
1847, collective urban food riots were exceptional.77 In that decade, there was a marked rise 
in rural criminality, including trespassing, pillaging and vagrancy. By comparison with the 
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1850s, the potato famine hurt rural populations much more; it instigated more small-scale, less 
coordinated, and less readily visible forms of social action.
(c) Natality and mortality
The impact of both food crises on births and deaths was notably different between town and 
countryside. In Figures 5 and 6 we make a distinction between urban and rural natality and 
mortality ratios. Town and countryside could only be distinguished using national data based 
on the official designation of municipalities, so what the graphs show are approximations. 
Nevertheless, they show that the overall impact of the 1840s food crisis was more drastic, 
and that the crisis of the 1850s hit urban areas harder than rural areas. Birth rates in the 
1850s dropped below the levels of the 1840s in the towns, whereas they stayed higher in the 
countryside. Apart from the mortality peak in 1849 caused by cholera, urban death rates in 
the 1850s rose close to the level of the 1840s, whereas in the countryside hikes in death rates 
in the 1850s were less marked, and came later than in the towns. The rise in mortality in 1854 
was also partly the result of a cholera epidemic, but this wave was relatively mild compared to 
1849.78 Both indicators of mortality and natality show that the effects of the food crisis were 
most evident in 1855, suggesting that the longevity of the period of expensive grain exhausted 
many people’s resources, especially in urban settings.
(d) Poverty
Finally, the observation that, in general, urban dwellers suffered more in the 1850s price crisis is 
supported by data on the number of registered poor. In Figure 7 we record poverty rates in the 
provinces of East Flanders and Liège; both provinces have a strong urban and rural industrial 
sector. In East Flanders, the number of registered poor was initially higher in rural areas, but 
the situation reversed in the 1850s. Poverty in the towns in the 1850s exceeded the levels of the 
1840s, whereas in the countryside there was only an interruption in the decline from the very 
high numbers of the 1840s. In Liège, registered poverty was greater in urban areas and rose in 
the 1850s to levels comparable to those of the 1840s. In the Liège countryside, by contrast, the 
impact of the food crisis of the 1850s was hardly visible.
All these indications are consistent with our claim that in Belgium, distress in the 1850s was 
less the result of an actual shortage of food than of high prices and concomitant problems 
of food distribution. In general, towns were hit harder by the food crisis of the 1850s than 
rural areas. Still, the food crisis did not go unnoticed in the countryside, as our demographic 
data also show, because there too the number of households who had no access to land was 
increasing. Only a small minority of farms produced sufficient surpluses to be able to benefit 
from high food prices. The crisis produced divergent effects, depending on the households’ 
position in the food market. Due to higher prices, a portion of the population in towns and 
the countryside had great difficulty fulfilling their daily dietary needs, even though per capita 
food availability was not notably lower.
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These findings concur with the few existing studies of the crisis of the 1850s. In comparison 
with 1845–47, this crisis was relatively mild in its overall effects, targeting particularly market-
dependent wage earners. Therefore, it mainly hit the urban population, as Herment confirmed 
in his study on France.79 As in the Netherlands, Belgium did not encounter notable deficits in 
bread grains.80 If government intervention helped reduce the impact of the crisis, as Herment 
and Solar suggest, it was probably mainly at the local level, where institutions could strengthen 
people’s purchasing power by providing direct support (financial or in kind) or by providing 
additional incomes (e.g. through public works), thereby allowing them to buy the food that 
was on sale. Still, it seems that central and local governments responded much more swiftly, 
and with a broader set of interventionist measures, to the food crisis of 1845–47.81 This is in 
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f ig u r e  7: Urban and rural poverty in East Flanders and Liège, 1841–1859
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sharp contrast to the hesitant behaviour of the central government in the 1850s, probably 
due to changing power relations at the top of Belgium’s industrializing society. The problem 
was not the supply of food, but the cost of food. This price was increasingly perceived as the 
outcome and the regulator of market transactions, which should be independent from direct 
intervention by public authorities. This created new forms of vulnerability that could only be 
countered by new, more formal, regulated forms of social policies.
V
Returning to the question of why there was no crisis in the 1850s comparable to that of the 
1840s, we have developed the argument that these two crises were different in character, 
and hence had a different impact on different groups in society. Firstly, the 1850s were not 
characterized by food scarcity at the aggregate level, in contrast to the 1840s. In 1845 and 1846 
the potato blight struck, and there was a substantial drop in rye yields in 1846. The grain 
harvests of 1853 and 1855 were deficient, but not as much as that of 1846, while potato harvests 
were recovering from the blight. Because imports covered much of the deficit, there was not 
noticeably less food available in the mid-1850s compared to previous years. Prices however 
were high, not only because of poor harvests but also as a result of the anxiety surrounding 
the Crimean War, the blockade of Baltic and Black Sea ports and Russia’s export prohibition 
on grains. Among other things, this led to elevated freight and insurance rates, and general 
tensions in the international grain trade throughout the time of the conflict. Prices followed 
unfamiliar patterns, and remained high for almost three constitutive years, from mid-1853 
until late 1856. For those reasons, we call the mid-1850s a food price crisis, but not, unlike the 
1840s, a famine crisis.
Secondly, the overall impact of the 1850s food price crisis was milder than that of the 1840s 
famine crisis, yet price hikes triggered by frictions in the international food chain impeded access 
to food for the market-dependent population. As we observed, urban populations suffered from 
increasing poverty, rising mortality and declining natality to a greater degree than populations 
in the countryside. These differing experiences of urban and rural populations are an indirect 
indication that the market-dependent population suffered most from the 1850s food price crisis. 
In the 1840s, distress was caused by both the lack of food and its high price; in the 1850s, the 
high price was the main issue. Contrary to the hungry 1840s, people in the 1850s protested in a 
succession of urban food riots against what they perceived to be speculation and unfair prices. 
Therefore, the problem was one of the distribution of food, rather than the availability of food. 
This echoes the famous quote of Amartya Sen, that a modern food crisis is not a matter of there 
not being enough food to eat, but of people not having enough food to eat.82
In Belgium in the 1850s, as in other regions in the North Sea area, the protracted decline of 
rural income and survival networks instigated new types of economic and social relations. This 
increased the vulnerability of large parts of the population to distortions in the international 
grain trade and to subsequent price volatility. This vulnerability was rooted in a combination 
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of two processes of rapid market expansion: food imports became increasingly indispensable to 
feed the population, and a fast-growing proportion of the population depended on precarious 
forms of wage earning to gain access to food. In turn, and in response to these developments, 
the food trade in Belgium became increasingly integrated in and dependent upon the global 
food market. Vulnerability to rising prices and worsening market conditions was not new, but 
the scale of its impact was. The expensive years of 1853–56 gave shape to what seems to have 
been one of the first major outbursts of this type of international food price crisis, not provoked 
by domestic harvest failures or by a breakdown of regional supply chains, but by imbalances in 
the emerging global food market. It affected Belgium’s economic and social fabric on a national 
level. This new type of vulnerability also reflected new types of societal tensions. Nineteenth-
century societies with growing segments of the population without their own means of 
production were much more reliant on, and exposed to, the vicissitudes of the market.
In the long run, Europe’s ‘escape from famine’ after 1850 was accompanied by a massive 
increase in food availability, better food security, declining relative food prices and a shrinking 
agricultural population. The global extension of food chains and the dependence on interna-
tionalizing food markets transformed access and entitlement to food in major parts of western 
Europe. This transformation also came at a cost. New types of food crisis and food vulner-
ability affected European populations in the nineteenth century, and afflicted major parts 
of the world in the twentieth. Throughout history, answers to vulnerability related to access 
to food have been found in diversifying income and coping strategies, and in safeguarding 
access to resources, land and common goods. The drastic societal transformations in Europe 
after 1850 eroded former household and village security mechanisms and affected peasants’ 
ability to overcome short-term economic stress (such as harvest shortages, or variations in 
income, or food prices from one year to the next). To deal with the new forms of vulnerability 
that followed from this process, in the West, new types of welfare states eventually invested 
in prolonged food security (access to cheap food) and social protection. In large parts of the 
Global South, however, vulnerability has switched from a temporary to a structural state of 
being over the last few decades. The global food price crisis of 2007–08 made it clear that 
unstable markets and price volatility now affect the food security of hundreds of millions 
of families, both in cities and in the countryside. In this latest crisis, rising prices were not 
the result of disturbances in local supply and demand; they were triggered by global market 
fluctuations and price settings. According to international organizations, the first twenty-first 
century food crisis was man-made; it was caused by ‘short-run overshooting’ (bad harvests, 
low food stocks, export bans, speculation) and long-run negative shifts (population growth, 
demand for animal feed, biofuel policies). New urban populations and remaining peasantries 
have lost the protection of direct access to food and must now rely on ever more insecure 
income resources. These changes affect the entitlement position to food for an unprecedented 
number of people.83
